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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES.
[Selected from the current of American and English Decisions.]
BY
HORACE L. CHEYNEY, HENRY N. SMALTZ, JOHN A. MCCARTHY.
AEROLITE-APPROPRIATION BY FINDER.-The owner of the soil
upon which aerolite falls may maintain replevin against one who finds it
there and carries it off: Goddard v. Winchell, Supreme Court of Iowa,
October 4, 1892, WINCHELL, J. (52 Northwestern Rep., 1124).-J. A. 31CC
BAILMnENTS, GRATUITOUS-BANKS-SPECIAL DEPOSITS-LIABILITY"
FOR Loss.-The essence of a contract for bailment is diligence. A
special deposit was received by a bank through its cashier for gratuitous
safe keeping. The cashier appropriated the deposit to its own use.
Held: the bank is not liable if it can prove that it exercised due dili-
gence in selecting the cashier, and in not keeping him in office after it
knew or ought to have known, that he was untrustworthy. For in ap-
propriating the deposit to his own use, the cashier would not be acting
in the bank's business or within the scope of his employment: Merchants'
National Bank of Savannah v. Guilmartin, LUmpKIN, J., August 23, I89z
(15 S. E. Rep., 831).--. D. L.
CARRIERS - INJURIES TO PASSENGERS - CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE-RULES OF COMPANY-RIDING IN EXPRESS CAR.-In an action
for damages received in a collision, it appeared that the plaintiff, know-
ingly violating the defendant's rule, was in the express car at the time
the accident occurred; that he would not have been injured had he been
in a passenger coach, in which there was room; and that the conductor
of the train, although he knew the plaintiffs position, did not enforce
the rule. Held: that where a passenger, knowing the existence of a rule
of the company, willfully violates it, in an action for the recovery of
damages for injuries received in consequence of such violation, he cannot
rely upon the mere delinquency of the conductor or other agent charged
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-with its enforcement in the absence of anything which establishes the
concurrence of the company in the disregard of the regulation: Florida
So. Railway Co. v. Hirst, Supreme Court of Florida, July 20, 1892, per
RANnY, C.J. (II So. Rep., 5o6).-H. N. S.
COMMON CARRIERS-LIABILITY FOR Loss OF GooDs-AcT or GOD.
-The 2066 section of the code of Georgia reads as follows: "A com-
mon carrier . . . is bound to use extraordinary diligence. In case
of loss the presumption is against him, and no excuse avails him, unless
it was occasioned by the Act of God, or the public enemies of the State."
Held: that no degree of diligence whatever will excuse a common carrier
unless the loss occurs through an act of God or public enemies, and
where the immediate agency of the loss is shown to be an act of God, the
p-resumption still is that the loss is due to negligence, and in order to
combat this presumption it must be shown by the carrier that the act of
God is the sole cause of the loss: Richmond and D. R. R. Co. v. White,
Supreme Court of Georgia, BLEcKLZY, C. J., October 1, 1892 (15 S. R .
Rep., 8o2).-/W. D. L.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-TAxATIoN-WiAT CONTITUTES A DEALER.
-The State of Georgia taxes in the form of a license all sewing niachine
companies doing business in the State. The license tax is fixed; that is
it does not depend on the amount of the business. Held: that this tax
was constitutional as applied to sewing machine companies whose plants
were in other States. And, Held: that one who receives orders for sew-
ing machines, forwards these orders to the manufacturer, receives the
machines when sent in pursuance of the order and sends them to the
purchasers, does not engage in the business of selling sewing machines,
or become a dealer in them, or an agent: Weaver v. State, Supreme
Court of Georgia, SUMMONS, J., May I6, 1892 (r5 Fed. Rep., 84o).-
T. D. L.
CONTRACT Ot ]MPLOYMENT-EIGHT HOUR LAw.-Plaintiff, who
-was an engineer in the employ of defendant, brought an action to recover
compensation for services rendered beyond the eight hours which consti-
tute a day's work under the laws of Indiana. There had been no agree-
ment as to the number of hours which should constitute a day's work,
and the plaintiff worked overtime solely because required so to do by the
defendants. Held: that while under the laws of Indiana work overtime
by agreement is permitted for an extra compensation, yet where one
enters into an employment knowing he will be expected to work over-
time, and continues to work overtime without objection, or giving notice
of his intention to charge therefor, it will be implied that he consented
to the requirements of his employees, and he cannot recover for the
hours he worked each day beyond eight hours, as extra time: Helphen-
steine v. Hartig, et al., Appellate Court of Indiana, September 27, 1892,
per New, J. (31 N. R. Rep., 845).-H. NA. S.
CONTRACT, ASSIGNMENT OF - FORICLOSURE - ]J3CTMENT BY
MORTGAGBE.-A leased eighty acres of school land from the State, and
subsequently entered into a contract with B to surrender the lease to
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him, B to advance the first payment and purchase the land from the
State taking the contract in his own name, while A, upon repayment of
the money advanced and interest thereon was to receive an assignment
of the contract. A died, and B filed his claim against the estate for the
money loaned, but afterwards withdrew the same and assigned the con-
tract to the plaintiff, A's father. Neither A nor his wife, the defendant,
had repaid any part of the money loaned and paid out by B. Held (i),
that the plaintiff stands in the shoes of B, and if therefore entitled to a
decree of foreclosure and sale for the amount due; (2) but that the plain-
tiff could not recover possession of the land in a legal action of eject-
ment, since he had only an equitable title, and in this State a mort-
gagee cannot maintain ejectment. Malloy v. Malloy, Supreme Court
of Nebraska, September 21, 1892 (MAXWELL, C. J.), 52 N. W. Rep., 1097.
-A. ffMcC.
ERQUITY, DIsMISSAr. IN-PAYMENT OF CosTs.-The plaintiff brought
an action in the United States Circuit Court, which was dismissed upon the
plaintiff's failure to appear, and an order directed ordering the plaintiff to
pay costs. He subsequently brought an action in the State Court where upon
a motion to dismiss the suit because of non-payment of costs in the Fed-
eral Court, it was held: that the rule of the common law which prevented
the plaintiff from maintaining a second suit until the costs in a former
action concerning the same subject-matter were paid, had not been
adopted by the Code; but that the rule of equity which is governed by
all the circunistances of any case, permitting the second action to proceed
whenever a valid excuse is shown by the non-payment of costs, prevails.
Union Pac. R.R. v. Mertes, Supreme Court of Nebraska, September 21
1892, MAXwVELL, C. J. (52 Northwestern Rep., IO99).-J. A. 1cC.
GIFTS-INTER vIvos-DLIVERY-ELECTION OF AcTION.-A donor
had deposited bonds and coupons with a bank, and took a writing signed
by the cashier acknowledging their receipt, and that they were to be sold
and the proceeds placed to her credit. She subsequently endorsed this
receipt as follows:" Please let my nephew have the amount of the within
bill, and oblige L. P." The defendant, upon the faith of this receipt,
paid over to the nephew the amount represented by the bill. Held (I),
that delivery of the receipt was sufficient to uphold a gift of the money
represented by it; (2) that in an action brought by the donor's adminis-
trators against the bank, the fact that the administrators formerly sued
the donee and recovered judgment for the same funds constitutes an elec-
tion and ratification of the payment made by the bank to the donee, and
precluded a subsequent action against the bank on the same claim. Crook
v. First National Bank, Supreme Court of Wisconsin, September 27, 1892,
PINNEY, J. (52 N. W. Rep., 113i).-J. A -cMC.
INSURANCE -CONDITIONS OF PoLIc.-The fact that the loss of the
party assured has not been submitted to arbitration before suit brought
as provided by the conditions of the policy cannot avail as a defense,
where the plaintiff upon seeking an adjustment of the loss soon after it
occurred was met with a denial of all liability on the part of the defend-
ant and an assertion that the policy was not in force. Savage v. Phoenix
Ins. Co., Supreme Court of Montana, September 13, 1892, HARWOOD, J.
(31 Pac. Rep., 68).-J. A. lC.
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INSURANCE, LIFE4-CONDITIOXS IN POLICY-INSANITY--SUICIDg.-
A life insurance policy did not cover the risk of suicide, but provided
that in the event of the insured's suicide, "whether sane or insane," the
company should be liable only for the "sum of the net premiums, pre-
viously received, without interest." The insured waSfound dead, and the
coroner's jury found that the cause of death was insanity. There was no
other evidence tending to show the circumstances or causes of death.
Exceptions having been taken to the judgment of the lower court in an
action of assumpsit in favor of the plaintiff for the amount of premiums:
held, that there is no presumption of suicide, where the cause of death is
"insanity," and the person was found dead, the circumstances of death
remaining unknown. Under the facts, the presumption is that the death
was natural or accidental, and the plaintiff is entitled to a directed verdict
for the full amount of the policy. Waycott v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
Supreme Court of Vermont, August 25, 1892, per THOmPSON, J. TAFT,
J., dissenting. (24 Ath. Rep., 9 92.)-H. N. S.
INSURANc1-POLICY-LIMITATION AS TO Txmz oi BRINGING SUIT.
-Where a policy of insurance provides that no suit or action against the
company "unless such suit or action shall be commenced within twelve
months next after the date of the fire from which such loss shall occur,"
and another clause of the same policy provides that the company shall
be allowed sixty days after satisfactory proofs of loss shall have been sub-
mitted to the company in which to pay said loss; the twelve months lim-
itation as to suit does not commence to run until the expiration of sixty
days after presentation of proof of loss: Steel v. Phoenix Ins. Co., Circuit
Court of Appeals of the United States, Ninth Circuit, July i8, .1892,
HAwLEY, J., McKI.BNA, J., dissenting (5r Fed. 715).--H. L. C.
MALICIOUS PROSMCUTION-MALICE-PRoBABLB CAus-ADvIcz o
CouNsim.-Iu an action brought for malicious prosecution it appeared,
that the proceedings against the plaintiff had been conmenced by the
advice of the defendant's attorney; that ht a hearing before a magistrate
the plaintiff was discharged for want of jurisdiction; and that the prose-
cution was nollepros'd in another county after the prosecutor had been
advised by his attorney that, without reference to the truth of the charge,
the prosecution was likely to fail for want of jurisdiction. Held: That
the advice of counsel that the facts upon which the prosecution is based
is not only a defence to an action for malicious prosecution, but taking
such advice and acting thereon rebuts the inference of malice arising from
the want of probable cause. That under the facts, neither the discharge
by the magistrate nor by the Court was a fact from which either want of
probable cause or malice could be inferred: McClafferty v. Philp, Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, October 3, 1892, per STERRuTT, J. (24 Atl. Rep.,
Io42).-H. N. S.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION- EXCAVATING EBYOND CITv LIITS--
LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES -ULTRA VImB.-A declaration alleging that
the mayor and council of a city had "cut or caused to be cut a deep
ditch or excavation near, in and upon the south side of a lot of land be-
longing to petitioner" (outside the city limits), thereby causing damage,
was rightly dismissed on demurrer, as it set forth no legal cause of action.
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'The acts of the city authorities complained of were ultra vires, they hav-
ing, at the time the acts were done, no power or jurisdiction over the
land in question. Consequently the municipal corporation is not liable
for damages resulting from such acts: Lord v. Mayor, etc., of City of
Columbus, Supreme Court of Georgia, per CURIAm, August 27, 1892 (15
S. E. Rep.; 818).-W . D. L.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-CoNSIDBRATIo.-Iu an action on a
note for $625 it appeared that as a consideration for the note, the plaintiff
transferred to defendant a one-half interest in a note for $2,500, on which
-themaker thereof agreed to pay $I,25o as a compromise. Held: That
the fact that afterwards in an action thereon, the latter note was declared
to have been made without consideration does not affect the considera-
tion for the note in suit, and plaintiff should recover: Bean v. Proseus,
Supreme Court of California, September 12, 1892, PATTESON, J. (31 Pac.
Rep., 49).-J. 4. McC.
.RAILWAY COmPANImS-CoNN-EcTING LINEs-INThRSTATB Com-
:mERce AcT.-Section 3 of the Interstate Commerce Act prohibiting any
common carrier from making or giving "any undue or unreasonable pref-
erence or advantage to any particular person, company, firm, corporation
or locality, or any particular description of traffic, in any respect whatever,"
etc., does not compel any railroad company to receive freight from a con-
mecting line and transport the same in the cars in which it is tendered, and
to'pay the usual car mileage on such cars. In the absence of a contract
between connecting lines there is no obligation to transport freight in
the cars in which it is tendered if the freight is not of such a character
that it will be injured by transfer and if the company to which the freight
is tendered has cars of its own ready for such service. But if the con-
siecting line-transports the freight in the cars in which it is tendered, the
usual mileage for the use of such cars must be paid. Neither does said
section compel a railway company receiving freight from a connecting
line to advance or assume the payment of the charges due thereon for
the transportation from the point of origin to the connecting line: Ore-
gon Short Line & U. N. Rwy Co. v. Northern Pacific Rwy Co., Circuit
Court of the United States, District of Oregon, June 13, 1892, FIIELD, J.,
DEADY, J., dissenting (51 Fed. Rep., 465).
WILLS-CONSTRUCTION-BEQUESTS CHARGED ON LAND.-A testa-
tor, after making sundry pecuniary bequests, gave to a son and daughter
"all the balance or residue of his estate, real and personal." After pay-
ment of the debts and costs of administration there was not sufficient left
to pay the bequests. Upon a petition filed by the administrator for the
sale of certain real estate to make assets, held: That in the absence of
specific devises of real estate the testator, by including his real estate in
the residuary clause along with his personal estate intended to treat
them as a common fund, thereby charging his whole estate with the
payment of the legacies; and it was therefore the duty of the adminis-
trator to sell the real estate for that purpose: American Cannel Coal Co.
v,. Clemens, el al., Supreme Court of Indiana, September 13, 1892, per
OLDS, J. (3I N. E. Rep., 786).-H. N. S.
